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INTRODUCTION 
“There is not a shadow of right in the general government to 
intermeddle with religion.”—James Madison, Journal Excerpt, 
1788.1 
 
When President Clinton signed the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) into law on September 22, 
2000, he gave religious prisoners a powerful tool for challenging 
prison regulations that burden their religious freedom.2  In Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA and consequently strengthened an already potent method 
for the religious prisoner to bring claims against prisons—one that is 
unavailable to non-religious inmates.3 
To understand the potential effects of RLUIPA, imagine a prisoner 
in jail for murder, who announces to his guards that he cannot 
perform his work duties on Wednesdays because Wednesday is a holy 
day in his religion, a form of Satanism.4  Until this point, he has never 
mentioned or demonstrated that he follows any religion.5  This 
prisoner also tells the guards that, because of his beliefs, he will need 
martial arts classes and special food.6  If the prison officials deny his 
                                                          
 1. AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, WHAT GOD HAS PUT 
ASUNDER: JAMES MADISON QUOTES ON CHURCH AND STATE, available at http:// 
www.au.org/site/DocServer/Madison.pdf?docID=141 (last visited July 26, 2006). 
 2. See Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President (Sept. 22, 2000), 
available at http://remnant-online.com/ubb/Forum24/HTML/000085.html (stating 
that President Clinton supported RLUIPA because it would provide protection for 
the religious rights of Americans). 
 3. See 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2121 (2005) (finding that RLUIPA is constitutional 
because it is a valid accommodation of religion). 
 4. Cf. Gregory S. Walston, Federalism and Federal Spending: Why the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 is Unconstitutional, 23 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 479, 480 (2001) (noting that in one claim that arose under RLUIPA a prisoner 
sought to avoid his Monday work duties by declaring a religion with a Monday 
Sabbath). 
 5. Cf. Kevin M. Powers, The Sword and the Shield: RLUIPA and the New Battle 
Ground of Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 163 (2004) (indicating that 
there is no requirement that a prisoner give authorities notice of his religion in order 
to obtain protection under the First Amendment). 
 6. Cf. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding a RLUIPA 
challenge to prison officials’ refusal to provide a plaintiff inmate with a special kosher 
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request, a court will most likely hear this prisoner’s claim under 
RLUIPA, even though the same court would probably dismiss his 
claim if it was not religious in nature.7  Thus, with the passage of 
RLUIPA, Congress enacted a law that favors inmates with religious 
beliefs over those who are agnostic or atheist, thereby blurring the 
traditional lines dividing Church and State.8 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
RLUIPA’s constitutionality will result in excessive litigation and 
unacceptable threats to important penological interests.9  Further, it 
contends that there is room for the Court to reexamine its application 
of Establishment Clause principles to RLUIPA to avoid these negative 
implications.10  Part I provides an overview of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and discusses the current state of prisoners’ 
constitutional rights.11  Additionally, Part I evaluates RLUIPA’s 
enactment, the Cutter decision, and its background.12  Part II.A 
argues that in Cutter the Court articulated a new standard in local 
prisons for adjudicating RLUIPA claims, which will lead to confusion 
in the lower courts.13  Finally, Part II.C considers the Court’s 
Establishment Clause analysis in Cutter and suggests alternate 
perspectives that the Court could have considered.14 
                                                          
diet). 
 7. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2005) (explaining that RLUIPA applies to cases in which the 
government imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise in a program or 
activity that receives federal funding or is subject to the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution). 
 8. See Ada-Marie Walsh, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000: Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189, 189 (2001) 
(noting that RLUIPA protects only those citizens who adhere to an organized 
religious creed). 
 9. See infra Part II.B (discussing the way in which RLUIPA curtails prison 
officials’ ability to guard against security threats and escape risks). 
 10. See infra Part II.C (explaining that a future Court could reexamine the 
unconstitutional burden RLUIPA places on non-religious prisoners). 
 11. See infra Part I.B (discussing the rational basis standard courts apply to 
prisoners’ religious rights and other fundamental rights). 
 12. See infra Part I.D (discussing the factual circumstances and procedural history 
behind Cutter). 
 13. See infra Part II.A (explaining that, in Cutter, the Court placed restraints on 
RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard). 
 14. See infra Part II.C (explaining that the Cutter Court’s analysis focused on the 
Establishment Clause’s requirement that there be neutrality between particular 
religions, instead of between religion and irreligion). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Establishment Clause Doctrine 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”15  The 
Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause is to separate the Church from the State.16  Thus, the 
Establishment Clause attempts to protect against the government 
expressing a preference between religions or privileging a religion 
over non-religion.17  Neutrality is the fundamental requirement of the 
Establishment Clause.18  However, in Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the 
Court stated that the government may accommodate religious 
practices without violating the Establishment Clause.19 
B.  Prisoners’ Rights 
Prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional protections upon 
incarceration; however, lawful imprisonment deprives citizens of 
many privileges and rights.20  Therefore, when the Supreme Court 
crafted a test for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims, its goal 
was to balance the need to protect prisoners’ constitutional rights and 
the desire not to restrict prison administrators’ ability to perform their 
                                                          
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) 
(explaining that the framers of the Constitution purposely worded the Establishment 
Clause to prohibit laws “respecting religion” so that, although a law might not 
establish a religion, it might be one “respecting” religion in the sense that it could 
lead to establishment and consequently violate the First Amendment). 
 16. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (relying 
on the words of founding father Thomas Jefferson, the Court stated that the purpose 
of the “clause against establishment of religion by law” was to “erect a wall of 
separation between church and state”). 
 17. See id. (interpreting the Establishment Clause). 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . .  
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.  Id. 
 18. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (emphasizing that a 
democratic government must be neutral in all religious matters). 
 19. See 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to 
a statutory exemption for religious organizations from a Title VII prohibition on 
religious discrimination). 
 20. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987) (noting that subject to 
some restrictions, prisoners retain the fundamental right to marry), and Lee v. 
Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (explaining that prisoners retain their right 
to equal protection of laws), with O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 
(1987) (explaining that the requirements of the prison system justify the need for 
prison regulations that constrict prisoners’ constitutional rights, such as the right to 
marry). 
4
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss3/5
2006] HEAVEN HELP US 589 
jobs effectively.21  The resulting test is a rational basis standard, which 
the Supreme Court applies in most cases regarding prison regulations 
that burden prisoners’ constitutional rights.22  Under a rational basis 
standard, courts will uphold a law if it is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose.23  The Court articulated the four-part 
test in Turner v. Safley for analyzing the reasonableness of regulations 
that burden prisoners’ fundamental rights: (1) whether there is a 
“valid, rational connection” between a prison regulation and a 
legitimate government interest; (2) whether there are alternative 
means available to the prisoner to exercise that right; (3) the impact 
of accommodating the religious right on prison resources, guards and 
other inmates; and (4) whether there are alternatives to the 
regulation in question.24 When applying this test, courts generally 
give significant deference to prison administrators and are unlikely to 
interfere with the internal administration of prisons because the 
judiciary does not want to interfere with important penological 
objectives.25  Further, courts do not want judicial interference to 
undermine prison security or endanger prison officials.26  Courts 
accept that prison administrators are experts in their field and tend to 
know more about the supervision of their institutions than judicial 
officers.27 
                                                          
 21. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 85 (noting that when the Court developed a test for 
adjudicating prisoners’ constitutional claims, it considered the difficulties of prison 
administration, as well as the importance of individual freedom). 
 22. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 646 
(2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2002) (1980) (explaining that the challenger bears the 
burden of proof under rational basis review). 
 23. See Guerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 279 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the 
rational basis test is deferential to the government). 
 24. See 482 U.S. at 89-90 (noting that the Court chose to apply a rational basis 
analysis instead of a strict scrutiny, which would hinder the ability of prison officials to 
run prisons). 
 25. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (holding that courts should 
defer to prison and state officials who must cope with the explosive environment of 
penal institutions); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) (listing as valid 
penal objectives the deterrence of crime, rehabilitation, and security). 
 26. See Sheley v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987) (Edmonson, J., 
dissenting) (remarking that courts should increase deference to prison administrators 
in issues concerning prison security, even if a prison restriction interferes with 
prisoners rights). 
 27. See Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188, 1195-96 (W.D. Ky. 1987) 
(determining that trained prison administrators can resolve problems more 
effectively than judges). 
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C.  Background of RLUIPA 
1.  The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act 
A complete understanding of RLUIPA necessitates a discussion of 
RLUIPA’s predecessor, The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”), as RLUIPA re-enacts the same substantive constitutional 
standard of RFRA.28  Both RFRA and RLUIPA apply a strict scrutiny 
standard of review to claims regarding religious rights, which is a 
higher standard than rational basis review.29  Under strict scrutiny, 
courts only uphold a law that burdens religious rights if the 
government can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest.30 
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court’s 1990 
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. 
Smith, in which the Court held that the Constitution does not require 
the application of a strict scrutiny standard to laws of general 
applicability that burden the free exercise of religion.31  RFRA 
prohibited federal and state governments from substantially 
burdening the free exercise of religion unless the government could 
show that the burden furthered a compelling government interest 
and was the least restrictive means of doing so.32 
Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 pursuant to its enforcement 
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.33  During the five years of 
RFRA’s enactment, the Court frequently heard cases regarding prison 
regulations.34  To invoke RFRA, a plaintiff had to show that a 
                                                          
 28. See Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that Congress used the same strict scrutiny language from RFRA in the 
RLUIPA section that applies to prisoners). 
 29. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) 
(2000) (stating that the purpose of RLUIPA was to re-enact the strict scrutiny 
standard of RFRA and specifically apply it to institutionalized persons and land use 
provisions). 
 30. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 387 (2004) (noting that in strict 
scrutiny review, the State generally has the burden of proving that a regulation that 
affects a fundamental right is necessarily related to a compelling interest). 
 31. See 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding a state law of general applicability 
criminalizing peyote use, which led to the denial of unemployment benefits to Native 
Americans, who lost their jobs because of their peyote use). 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2005) (opining that the compelling interest test is an 
appropriate test for striking a balance between religious liberty and competing 
government interests). 
 33. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (empowering Congress to “enforce” the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of life, liberty, and property through 
“appropriate legislation”). 
 34. See, e.g., Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1995) (hearing a Rastifari 
inmate’s challenge to prison grooming regulations under RFRA); Show v. Patterson, 
955 F. Supp. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying defendant’s motion for summary 
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government action placed a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s 
sincere religious belief.35  If the plaintiff could show a substantial 
burden, the government had to prove it had a compelling interest in 
burdening the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.36 
The Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional in City of 
Boerne v. Flores on the grounds that Congress exceeded its 
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.37  The 
Supreme Court adopted the traditional interpretation of the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and determined 
that Congress’s power to enforce is solely “preventative” or 
“remedial.”38  The Court concluded that RFRA not only remedied 
constitutional violations, but also created constitutional rights in 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.39 
2.  Enactment of RLUIPA 
Congress’s response to City of Boerne was to enact RLUIPA, which 
narrowed RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard to apply only to two areas: 
land use regulation and persons in institutions, including prisons, 
mental hospitals, and nursing homes.40  Congress based the need for 
RLUIPA on three years of hearings, which concluded that inmates 
were at the mercy of prison officials, who often imposed arbitrary 
                                                          
judgment because prison officials may have violated the First Amendment religious 
rights of Muslim prison inmates by strip searching the prisoners); cf. Storm v. Town 
of Woodstock, 944 F. Supp. 139, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the local parking 
laws did not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion under RFRA); 
Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d. 1294, 1303 (1996) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that 
the University subsidized insurance program that covered abortions violated the free 
exercise of religion of students because the plan did not substantially burden their 
religious practice, and it satisfies strict scrutiny). 
 35. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (explaining that a 
substantial burden occurs when the government forces a person to choose between 
following his religion and giving up benefits or abandoning his religion). 
 36. See James A. Hanson, Missouri’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A New 
Approach to the Cause of Conscience, 69 MO. L. REV. 853, 856 n.19 (2004) (noting 
that the strict scrutiny test applied to the government under RFRA and RLUIPA is the 
“strictest standard available at law”). 
 37. See 521 U.S. 507, 524, 536 (1997) (finding RFRA unconstitutional pursuant 
to the Fourteenth Amendment in a case involving the Catholic Archbishop of San 
Antonio’s challenge, under RFRA, to the local zoning authority’s denial of a building 
permit to enlarge a church). 
 38. See id. at 529 (noting that the majority did not reach the issue of whether 
RFRA violated the Establishment Clause because the Court declared RFRA 
unconstitutional regarding the Enforcement Clause). 
 39. See id. at 532, 536 (explaining that RFRA’s great flaw was that it attempted to 
change constitutional protections substantially by prohibiting state conduct that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit). 
 40. See RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2005) (noting that RLUIPA’s 
substantive language, which is identical to RFRA’s, prohibits the government from 
placing a burden on religious exercise unless that burden furthers a “compelling” 
government interest and is the “least restrictive” means of doing so). 
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rules regarding the right to practice religion.41  Congress relied on 
the Judiciary Committee reports on RFRA, which concluded that 
RFRA did not unreasonably burden the federal prison system.42  
Furthermore, RLUIPA creates a private right of action for people who 
believe the government has burdened their free exercise of religion.43 
D.  Cutter v. Wilkinson 
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, a practicing witch, a white supremacist 
minister, and followers of Asatru, a polytheistic Viking religion, all 
filed suit pursuant to RLUIPA.44  The plaintiffs claimed that the Ohio 
Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) denied them their access to 
religious literature, denied them their freedom to conform their 
appearance to the requirements of their religions, and denied them a 
prison chaplain trained in their religions.45 
The ODOC admitted that it refused to grant some of the plaintiffs’ 
religious requests, yet argued that these denials were necessary 
because the plaintiffs’ religious practices threatened prison security.46  
The plaintiffs contended that their religious practices were in no way 
violent and posed no threat to prison security.47 
On November 7, 2003, a Sixth Circuit panel held that RLUIPA 
violated the Establishment Clause because the Act favors religious 
rights over other fundamental rights and that the statute’s primary 
                                                          
 41. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement 
of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (noting that Congress held three hearings before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and six before the House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution on the need for this legislation and noting that prisoners are often 
exposed to religious discrimination). 
 42. See id. (explaining that prisoners are in an extremely vulnerable position 
because their religious rights are in the hands of a few officials). 
 43. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2005) (stating that any person may assert a 
violation of RLUIPA in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the 
government). 
 44. See 349 F.3d 257, 260 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005) (noting 
that the Sixth Circuit consolidated three cases in Cutter for the purpose of deciding 
the Ohio Department of Correction’s facial challenge to RLUIPA: Gerhardt v. 
Lazaroff, Case No. C2-95-517; Hampton v. Wilkinson, Case No. C2-98-275; and Miller 
v. Wilkinson, Case No. C2-97-382). 
 45. See Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832-33 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(explaining that the plaintiffs originally brought their claims under the rational basis 
standard of Turner v. Safley), rev’d sub nom., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113 
(2005).  However, after the enactment of RLUIPA, the plaintiffs amended their 
complaints to contend that the more restrictive standards in RLUIPA applied to 
ODOC’s actions.  Id. 
 46. See id. (noting that the defendants claimed, for example, that investigators 
linked the practice of Asatru to a 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 
as well as murders and escapes at other Ohio prisons). 
 47. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005) (identifying that for the 
purposes of the case, the defendants conceded that these are bona fide religions and 
the plaintiffs do hold the beliefs of their respective religions). 
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purpose was not to accommodate religion, but to advance religion.48  
The Sixth Circuit was the only circuit to hold that RLUIPA violates the 
Establishment Clause.49  As the Sixth Circuit noted, the “juggernaut” 
of circuit court opinions has come to the opposite conclusion 
regarding RLUIPA’s constitutionality.50  The Fourth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits rejected Establishment Clause challenges to RLUIPA, 
concluding that RLUIPA has a legitimate and secular legislative 
purpose and that the statute does not create more rights for religious 
inmates.51  As a result of this circuit split, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.52 
On May 31, 2005, Justice Ginsberg issued a unanimous opinion for 
the Supreme Court, reversing the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and 
upholding the constitutionality of RLUIPA.53  The Court held that 
RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provision does not violate the 
Establishment Clause because it merely alleviates “government-
created” burdens on prisoners’ religious practice and, therefore, is a 
lawful accommodation of religion.54  Further, the Court emphasized 
                                                          
 48. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265, 2268-69, rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005) (explaining 
that the Sixth Circuit based its decision that RLUIPA violates the Establishment 
Clause on the Supreme Court’s test for adjudicating Establishment Clause challenges, 
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 
(1971) (creating a three-prong test, which remains the prevailing method to 
determine whether a statute complies with the Establishment Clause).  Under the 
Lemon test, a statute is permissible if (1) it has a secular legislative purpose, (2) its 
primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not create 
excessive entanglement between government and religion.  Id. 
 49. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264, rev’d, 125 S.Ct 2113 (2005) (holding that 
RLUIPA advances religion in violation of the Establishment Clause); see also Anne Y. 
Chiu, Comment, When Prisoners’ Souls Are Weary and Their Religious Exercise 
Burdened, RLUIPA Provides Some Rest for Their Souls, 79 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1017 
(2004) (noting that the Sixth Circuit departed from the other circuits in holding that 
RLUIPA favors religious rights over non-religious rights). 
 50. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262, rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005) (noting that two 
district court opinions stood against the rest of the circuit courts, and these are the 
opinions on which the Cutter Court relied). 
 51. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 317-19 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
prison officials violated RLUIPA when they denied a Jewish prisoner kosher meals); 
Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 611 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a Muslim inmate’s 
right to access prayer oil in prison); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069 
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, under RLUIPA, prison officials could not bar Muslim 
inmates from attending Friday prayer sessions). 
 52. See Respondents’ Brief in Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 
Cutter, 125 S.Ct. 308 (2004) (No. 03-9877) (noting that the parties to Cutter agreed 
that the question of RLUIPA’s alleged violation of the Establishment Clause was ripe 
for review). 
 53. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2116 (noting that Justice Thomas filed a concurring 
opinion in order to discuss how the issue of federalism applies to RLUIPA). 
 54. See id. (remarking that an act which removes government burdens is more 
likely to be an accommodation of religion than an endorsement of religion).  The 
Court chose not to decide Cutter pursuant to the Lemon v. Kurtzman analysis, on 
which the Sixth Circuit relied for its decision.  Id. at 2120. 
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that RLUIPA is consistent with the Establishment Clause because it 
does not differentiate between particular religions.55  Additionally, 
the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s argument that RLUIPA 
impermissibly advances religion by affording religion greater 
protection than other constitutionally protected rights.56  Although 
the Sixth Circuit argued that, under RLUIPA, religious claims receive 
more protection than other constitutional claims because they receive 
strict scrutiny review, the Court emphasized that the Constitution 
does not require that all constitutional rights receive legislative 
protections at the same time or in the same manner.57  Further, 
benefits to religious exercise need not be paired with benefits to non-
religious constitutional rights.58  According to the Court, if this were 
the case, “all manner of religious accommodations” would fail because 
each act of Congress, which provided for religious accommodation, 
would have to provide for a corresponding secular right.59 
Justice Ginsberg also emphasized that RLUIPA does not place the 
need to accommodate prisoners’ religious activities above the need to 
maintain prison order and security.60  The Court determined that 
prison security is a compelling state interest, and thus prison officials 
deserve deference in maintaining penal safety.61  The Court based 
this decision, in part, on precedent demonstrating that religious 
accommodation must be balanced to ensure it does not trump other 
significant interests.62  Further, the Court examined the legislative 
                                                          
 55. See id. at 2123 (noting the Supreme Court had previously invalidated a 
statute that created a separate school district solely for a particular sect of Jews). 
 56. See id. at 2123-24 (reaffirming the Court’s decision in Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, where it 
held that a statute exempting religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition 
against discrimination was not unconstitutional, even though it singled out religious 
groups for a benefit). 
 57. See id. at 2124 (citing Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003)) 
(noting that there is no legal requirement that legislative protections for 
constitutional rights “march in lockstep”). 
 58. See id. (emphasizing that providing prisoners with a chaplain does not also 
require providing a political consultant or a publicist). 
 59. See id. (arguing that if the Court held RLUIPA unconstitutional, it could no 
longer grant military personnel permission to wear religious attire while in uniform); 
see also David L. Hudson Jr., A Lower Bar to Religion Behind Bars, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 
22 (2005) (quoting Anthony Picarello, President of the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty) (“If [the Cutter decision] had gone the other way, religion-only based 
accommodations which-exist nationwide and at every level of government: federal, 
state and local would have been struck down wholesale”). 
 60. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2122 (explaining that accommodation must be 
balanced so that it does not thwart other important interests). 
 61. See id. at 2122-24 n.13 (noting that when determining a compelling 
governmental interest “context matters”). 
 62. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709-11 (1985) (striking down 
a law that weighed the religious interests of Sabbatarians over all other interests). 
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history behind RLUIPA and found that Congress enacted RLUIPA 
with the need to maintain penal order and security in mind.63  Thus, 
the Court determined that if inmate requests for accommodations 
become excessive or imposed too many burdens on prison officials, 
then as-applied challenges would be appropriate.64  The Court’s 
unanimous decision both reaffirmed the principle that legislative 
accommodations of religion do not violate the Establishment Clause 
and stressed the importance of prison security and safety.65 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  In the Aftermath of the Cutter Decision a New Standard of Review 
Emerges for Adjudicating RLUIPA Claims: Deferential Strict Scrutiny 
Although the Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA’s institutionalized 
persons’ provision and its strict scrutiny standard of review, it did so 
with the caveat that RLUIPA requires significant deference to the 
judgment of prison officials.66  Justice Ginsberg repeatedly 
emphasized that courts should interpret RLUIPA’s elevated standard 
to incorporate deference to the prison system’s interest in 
maintaining safety and order, often referring to RLUIPA’s legislative 
history.67  As a result, Justice Ginsberg called for a standard of review 
that is strict, yet deferential.68 
This decision could be interpreted to mean that the Court is calling 
for a new standard of review: one that falls somewhere between the 
rational basis approach urged by the Sixth Circuit and the absolute 
strict scrutiny that appears on the face of the statute.69  If this is the 
                                                          
 63. See 139 CONG. REC. 26190, S14350, S14364 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (remarks 
of Sen. Hatch) (predicting that courts would apply RLUIPA with due deference to 
the expertise of prison officials to maintain good order and discipline). 
 64. But see Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124-25 (noting that the Court did not anticipate 
abusive prisoner litigation or excessive burdens on prison officials). 
 65. See id. at 2121 (noting that the government need not ignore compelling 
impositions state actions placed on religion). 
 66. See id. at 2124 n.13 (“It bears repetition . . . that prison security is a 
compelling state interest, and that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise 
in this area.”). 
 67. See id. at 2122 (explaining that the Court does not interpret RLUIPA to 
elevate accommodation of religion over prisons’ interest in security).  The legislative 
history anticipated that RLUIPA be applied with deference to prison administrators.  
Id. at 2123 (citing 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint 
statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy)); 139 CONG. REC. 26190 (1993) (remarks of 
Senator Hatch). 
 68. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2123 (instructing that RLUIPA should be applied in a 
balanced way with “particular sensitivity to security concerns”) (emphasis added). 
 69. See Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court’s New Ruling on the Religious Land 
and Institutionalized Persons Act’s Prison Provisions:  Deferring Key Constitutional 
Questions, June 2, 2005,  http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050602.html 
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case, the Cutter decision was not a complete defeat for opponents of 
RLUIPA.70  Under strict scrutiny, courts rarely, if ever, uphold 
regulations imposed by prison officials on inmates’ religious 
freedoms.71  Indeed, strict scrutiny has been described by the Court as 
“strict in theory, fatal in fact.”72  Therefore, by requiring lower courts 
to “appropriately” balance inmates’ religious freedoms with deference 
to prisons’ security interests, the Court places a significant limitation 
on RLUIPA’s substantive standard.73  However, by placing this 
constraint on RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard, and thus creating a 
new standard of review, the Cutter decision will ultimately lead to 
indecision in the lower courts concerning the application of RLUIPA.  
Consequently, both the penal and court systems will struggle with the 
burden of an uncertain RLUIPA standard. 
The seemingly contradictory standard announced in Cutter follows 
earlier Supreme Court decisions that required deference to 
administrators in the face of prisoners’ constitutional rights claims.74  
Thus, one possible explanation for the Court’s decision to articulate 
this confusing and diluted standard is to adhere, at least partially, to 
the rationale of its earlier prisoners’ rights decisions.75  RLUIPA’s 
                                                          
(remarking that the standard of review expressed in Cutter resembles intermediate 
scrutiny review). 
 70. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS AND PUB. LIFE, THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN CUTTER V. WILKINSON: THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF 
THE LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT, 3 (June 2005) [hereinafter PEW 
FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT] (noting that Justice Ginsberg’s “interpretive gloss on 
RLUIPA” may make it harder for prisoners to assert some RLUIPA claims in the 
future). 
 71. See generally Libby Huskey, Constitutional Law—Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education—Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact?  Grutter v. Bollinger, 4 
WYO. L. REV. 439, 454 (2004) (explaining that Supreme Court Justices in affirmative 
action cases referred to strict scrutiny as a very harsh test). 
 72. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the strict standard is appropriate for brutal and repugnant 
types of racism). 
 73. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 3 (noting that 
although the Court unanimously upheld RLUIPA, it placed important qualifications 
on the future application of the statute and that Justice Ginsberg “laconically 
dismissed” the idea that RLUIPA would impose a burden on prison officials). 
 74. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-51 (1987) (recognizing 
the need to defer to the experience of prison officials and articulating a rational basis 
standard for prisoners’ free exercise claims); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 
(1987) (noting that in developing a test for inmates’ constitutional rights, the Court 
must defer to the expertise of prison administrators). 
 75. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 85 (noting that only prison administrators have the 
expertise to deal with the specialized and difficult problems that arise in prisons); 
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (arguing that the 
courts should give broad deference to prison officials because of the complicated 
nature of prison administration); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) 
(explaining that considerations of prison security are “peculiarly within the province” 
of prison officials). 
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strict scrutiny standard ignores the important penological interests 
that were behind the Court’s development of the Turner rational 
basis test and, therefore, places accommodation over the compelling 
interests of security and discipline.76  Although RLUIPA’s supporters 
contend that strict scrutiny is absolutely necessary to protect 
prisoners’ religious rights, the Turner Court specifically rejected a 
strict scrutiny approach to inmates’ fundamental rights because it 
would subject the day-to-day decisions of prison officials to an 
inflexible standard, placing a straightjacket on their ability to solve 
security problems.77  The Turner Court believed that a strict scrutiny 
standard for prisoners’ rights would “distort” the decision-making 
process because courts, which are ill-equipped to deal with prison 
security issues, would constantly second-guess prison administrators.78  
This rationale seemingly justifies the Cutter Court’s new “strict but 
deferential” standard for RLUIPA. 
Justice Ginsberg repeatedly referred to the legislative history 
behind RLUIPA and stressed that RLUIPA’s proponents recognized 
the necessity of prison safety and discipline.79  According to the 
Court, lawmakers supporting RLUIPA anticipated that courts would 
interpret RLUIPA with due deference to prison officials’ expertise.80  
However, the legislative record behind the enactment of RLUIPA is 
troublesome.81  Both houses of Congress suspended the rules and no 
public hearings occurred before RLUIPA’s extremely fast passage.82  
Therefore, there was little debate about RLUIPA’s constitutionality 
and no examination of the burdens it would place on prison 
officials.83 
                                                          
 76. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (emphasizing the need for a standard that 
balanced the need to protect prisoners’ rights and judicial restraint regarding inmate 
claims).  Further, the Court recognized that the problems in prisons are complex, 
they require expertise, detailed planning, and are not easily remedied by judicial 
interference.  Id. 
 77. See id. at 89 (deciding that prison officials, rather than the courts, are to 
make the difficult decisions regarding the operations of prisons). 
 78. See id. (noting that, under a strict scrutiny test, there is a possibility that a 
court could reverse every administrative judgment). 
 79. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2123 (2005) (noting that the 
lawmakers who enacted RLUIPA meant for prison administrators to establish the 
regulations and procedures necessary to maintain order and security in prisons). 
 80. See id. (noting that the lawmakers who supported RLUIPA realized the 
necessity for maintaining safety and discipline in prisons). 
 81. See American Atheists, Scaled-Down Religious Act is Done Deal-For Now, 
Aug. 18, 2000, http://www.atheists.org/flash.line.rlpa38.html (commenting on the 
“Machiavellian” way in which Congress re-enacted the RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard 
in RLUIPA, after the Court deemed RFRA unconstitutional). 
 82. See id. (noting that the passage of RLUIPA stunned professional lobbying 
groups who opposed RLUIPA’s enactment). 
 83. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS 
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This whirlwind passage of RLUIPA was most likely a result of 
pressure from the myriad of powerful religious groups backing 
RLUIPA.84  Congress did not discuss either the traditional deference 
given to prison officials or the reasons the Court gave rational basis 
review under Turner to prisoners’ rights during the enactment of 
RLUIPA.85  Further, Congress was aware that prisoners already had a 
remedy for infringement on religious rights: the Turner rational 
relation test that the Supreme Court has deemed acceptable for other 
fundamental rights.86  RLUIPA’s Congressional sponsors’ statement 
that they expected federal courts to defer to the decisions of prison 
officials regarding which restrictions on the exercise of religion are 
necessary in the prison context seems insincere considering that the 
enactment of RLUIPA replaced Turner in the arena of religious 
challenges, which provided for deference to prison officials.87  This 
inconsistency is another possible explanation for the Court’s decision 
to modify RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard. 
Justice Ginsberg’s analysis of RLUIPA and the Court’s “strict but 
deferential” standard will likely lead to confusion in the lower courts 
regarding how to apply the statute.88  On the one hand, the Court’s 
decision to uphold RLUIPA offers support to the statute and 
strengthens its provisions.89  On the other, Justice Ginsberg’s 
                                                          
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 93, 100 (2001) [hereinafter Hamilton, Federalism] 
(noting that both the House and the Senate passed RLUIPA within a half an hour of 
each other). 
 84. See Beyond the Pledge of Allegiance: Hostility to Religious Expression in the 
Public Square:  Hearing on S. H.R.G. 108-707 Before Subcomm. On the Constitution, 
Civil Rights and Property Rights of the Comm. On the Judiciary United States Senate, 
108th Cong. 143-161 (June 8, 2004) (statement of Melissa Rodgers, Professor, Wake 
Forest Divinity School) (explaining that a vast coalition urged the passage of RLUIPA, 
which included Muslims, Mormons, Methodists, and the National Association of 
Evangelicals). 
     85  See Hamilton, Federalism supra note 84, at 341 (noting that when 
accommodation of a right will have a “ripple effect” on fellow inmates, courts should 
be particularly deferential to prison officials). 
 86. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (noting the need for judicial 
restraint regarding the protection of prisoners’ free exercise claims). 
 87. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7774 (joint statements of Sens. Hatch and 
Kennedy) (noting that Congress should defer to the experience and expertise of 
prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to 
maintain good order, security, and discipline); cf. Lynn S. Branham, Go and Sin no 
More: The Constitutionality of Governmentally Funded Faith-Based Prison Units, 37 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 297 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court crafted the 
Turner test to make it difficult for prisoners’ constitutional rights claims to be 
successful). 
 88. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 3 (commenting that 
Justice Ginsberg did not explain or even mention RLUIPA’s “least restrictive means” 
requirement and that Justice Ginsberg maintained that courts must consider the 
context of cases when deciding “compelling interests”). 
 89. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, RLUIPA Upheld Unanimously in 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, May 31, 2005, http://www.rluipa.com/index.php/article/395. 
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repeated call for deference may lead lower courts to question the 
decision and consequently will foster more RLUIPA litigation.90  This 
uncertainty could ultimately burden both the court and prison 
systems, which will be forced to contend with the increase in RLUIPA 
claims.91 
B.  The Implementation of RLUIPA Results in Excessive Requests for 
Accommodation and Unacceptable Burdens on Important 
Penological Interests 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter will most likely result in an 
increase in litigation and thereby burden penological interests.  
Litigation will most likely increase whether the legal system is clogged 
by RLUIPA claims or whether prisoners interpret Cutter to strengthen 
RLUIPA.  Increased RLUIPA claims will burden prison officials who 
must concern themselves with potential litigation, rather than 
conducting the ordinary business of running their prisons.92  In 
determining RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the Cutter Court scrutinized 
the statute generally and failed to address specific applications of the 
statute.93  This section examines the potential impact of RLUIPA, the 
Court’s decision in specific cases, and the affect RLUIPA has already 
had on individual prison officials, local governments, and state 
departments of corrections. 
In Cutter, Justice Ginsberg presumed that RLUIPA will not 
undermine the state’s interest in security and implied that prisoners’ 
claims under RLUIPA will not be overwhelmingly successful.94  
However, an examination of RLUIPA suggests that the opposite is 
true.  First, the statute’s language allows for frivolous claims, which 
                                                          
html (proclaiming that Cutter is a “thumping victory” for religious exercise). 
 90. See Charles C. Haynes, Inside the First Amendment: With Little Fanfare, 
Religion Wins Big at the Supreme Court, June 12, 2005, available at http:// 
www.nna.org/GR/FirstAmendEd06-12-05.htm (noting that the Court’s decision in 
Cutter will not end the debate regarding RLUIPA’s constitutionality). 
 91. See Ruth Burdick, Note, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems 
Predicted and Encountered, and the Split over the Salerno Test, 23 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 825, 826 (1996) (discussing the increase in litigation that a lack of guidance and 
method for using a new standard causes). 
 92. See Marci Hamilton, Two Important Establishment Clause Issues the 
Supreme Court Will Decide This Term (Oct. 21, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw. 
com/hamilton/20041021.html [hereinafter Hamilton, Important Issues] (stating that 
under RLUIPA, every prison regulation is presumptively unconstitutional, resulting in 
difficulty in maintaining order). 
 93. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2124 (2005) (emphasizing that the 
Court is responding to a facial challenge to RLUIPA and therefore the Court did not 
examine the constitutionality of the results of RLUIPA’s application in specific 
circumstances). 
 94. See id. at 2123 (opining that the Court has no reason to believe that courts 
will not apply RLUIPA appropriately and with special attention to security needs). 
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place unreasonable strains on the prison and court system.95  Second, 
an assessment of actual RLUIPA actions reveals that the majority of 
prisoners’ claims are successful, even when important penological 
interests are at stake.96 
1.  RLUIPA’s “Religious Exercise” Requirement Allows for Excessive 
Litigation, Which Burdens Both the Prisons and Courts 
Congress drafted RLUIPA in a way that allows for an excessive 
number of prisoners’ claims.97  In order to invoke RLUIPA, the first 
threshold a prisoner must reach is to show that a government action 
“substantially” burdens his “religious exercise.”98  However, under 
RLUIPA this is an extremely low bar.99  The requirements of religious 
exercise are minimal and Congress designed them to allow for as 
many claimants as possible.100  RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to 
include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or 
central to a system of religious belief.”101  This broad standard does 
not limit the types of religious activities that qualify as “exercise” 
under RLUIPA; thus, any spiritual act is eligible for protection.102  
                                                          
 95. See Stephen A. Haller, On Sacred Ground: Exploring Congress’s Attempts to 
Rein in Discriminatory State Zoning Practices, 33 SW. U.L. REV. 285, 304-05 (2004) 
(noting that in the case of RLUIPA’s land use provision, RLUIPA’s broad definition 
of religious exercise could be used by a religious group to erect a health club or a 
drive-in restaurant). 
 96. See Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and 
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 515 
(2005) (noting that only seven of the forty-six prisoner RLUIPA claims from 2000 to 
2004 were dismissed for failing to demonstrate a substantial burden). 
 97. See Caroline Adams, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive the 
Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361, 2402 (2002) (contending 
that RLUIPA defines religious exercise more broadly than even the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation allows). 
 98. See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
plaintiff first must prove that the burdened exercise is religious and then that the 
burden is substantial); see also Gaubatz, supra note 97, at 515 (explaining that the 
Supreme Court defines substantial burden as a situation in which a government 
restriction placed on a privilege tends to inhibit religious exercise).  An example of a 
substantial burden is when a person must choose between following his religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on one hand, and abandoning his religion on the other hand.  Id. 
 99. See Powers, supra note 5, at 143 (noting that beliefs need not be coherent or 
systemic for the First Amendment to protect them). 
 100. See Hamilton, Important Issues, supra note 93, at 1 (stating that under 
RLUIPA, every prison regulation is presumptively unconstitutional, resulting in 
difficulty in maintaining order). 
 101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 
185 (1965) (articulating that the truth of a belief is not questionable). 
 102. See, e.g., Pounders v. Kempker, 79 F. App’x 941, 943 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that prison’s failure to provide a sweat lodge to Native American prisoners stated a 
claim under RLUIPA); Goodman v. Snyder, No. 00-C-0948, 2003 WL 715650, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2003) (determining that the use of tarot cards constituted a 
protected spiritual act under RLUIPA). 
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Further, the Supreme Court defines religious belief to include all 
beliefs that are sincere and “within the claimants own scheme of 
things, religious.”103 
In addition to its broad definition of religious exercise, RLUIPA 
precludes inquiry into whether a specific belief or practice is “central 
to a prisoner’s religion.”104  This means that if a prisoner brings a 
RLUIPA action claiming that a prison regulation burdens his religious 
exercise, the act the regulation burdens does not have to be a key 
element to his religious practice.105  Considering the complex 
security issues at stake in the prison system, it is possible that 
important prison regulations will be overruled for activities that are 
not at the crux of a prisoner’s religious practice.106  For example, in 
Goodman v. Snyder, an Illinois prisoner brought a RLUIPA claim 
because prison officials refused to provide him with the lacto-ovo 
vegetarian diet required by his Wiccan religion and also because the 
officials denied his request for tarot cards.107  The United States 
District Court for the East District of Illinois held that the prison’s 
refusal to provide the inmate with tarot cards violated the inmate’s 
rights under RLUIPA, even though the he never claimed the tarot 
cards were central to his religious practice.108 
In Cutter, the Supreme Court acknowledged RLUIPA’s minimal 
belief requirement and conceded that a court must follow an 
individual prisoner’s subjective opinion that a specific practice or 
request is a religious belief.109  Thus, under RLUIPA, one could label 
                                                          
 103. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185 (noting that a person cannot be forced to prove 
his religious convictions because what may be religious fact to one man may be 
unbelievable to another). 
 104. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2124 n.13 (2005) (explaining that 
when a court examines the religiosity of inmates under RLUIPA, the issue is whether 
the inmates’ beliefs are truly held); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (holding that it is not the judiciary’s 
job to question the validity of particular beliefs or the validity of a litigant’s 
interpretation of religion). 
 105. See generally Goodman, 2003 WL 715650, at * 5 (denying a prison’s summary 
judgment motion regarding a Wiccan prisoner’s request for Tarot cards that he 
desired in connection with his religion, but that were not required for the practice of 
his religion). 
 106. See Marria v. Broaddus, No. 97 Civ. 8297, 2003 WL 21782633, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 31, 2003) (forbidding the New York prison system’s ban on the Five Percenters’ 
religious literature, even though the prison administrators presented evidence that 
the Five Percenters engaged in gang activity). 
 107. See Goodman, 2003 WL 715650, at *1 (noting that the prison officials argued 
that the use of tarot cards is often prohibited in prisons because they contained 
symbols, such as the devil and pitchfork, used by gangs). 
 108. See id. at *5 (noting that the court dismissed the defendant prison officials 
summary judgment motion). 
 109. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124 n.13 (2005) (noting that the “truth of a 
[religious] belief is not open to question”). 
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virtually any practice in prison as “religious.”110  In the prison setting, 
RLUIPA’s minimal requirement for “religious exercise” means that 
not only may a prisoner claim to need special treatment, food, or 
access based on his religion, but also that society does not have to 
recognize his religion in any organized or accepted way.111  To bring 
a claim under RLUIPA, all a prisoner must do is profess that he 
believes in something, anything, and he will receive RLUIPA’s strict 
scrutiny standard, while prison administrators must bear the burden 
of demonstrating why the challenged prison regulation was 
compelling.112  Further, under RLUIPA, prison officials need not 
have any previous knowledge that a prisoner held alleged beliefs or 
necessitated certain “accommodations” before the administrator 
unknowingly may violate the prisoner’s exercise of these beliefs.113 
There is no limit to the type or number of religious beliefs that 
prisoners can claim under RLUIPA; thus, there are few limits to the 
number of cases prisoners may bring under the statute.114  When 
prisoners realize that they may claim to be followers of any religion, 
regardless of its practices or creed, and that they can demand special 
rights under RLUIPA, contrived religions may become commonplace 
in prisons because of the benefits religious prisoners receive.115  
Consequently, by upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the Supreme 
Court has created a powerful weapon for religious groups.116  Under 
RLUIPA, the number of prisoners claiming religious burdens and 
unorthodox beliefs most likely will increase, just as it did under 
                                                          
 110. See Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1454 (E.D. Cal 1996) (noting that in 
questions of religious practices, it does not matter what others regard as a religion, it 
matters what the litigant thinks). 
 111. See Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 516 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Va. 1981) 
(explaining that it is “fairly settled” that there is no requirement that a religion need 
meet any doctrinal test before it receives First Amendment protection). 
 112. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 
1140, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case 
that a prison regulation violates RLUIPA, the burden of proof shifts to the 
department of corrections). 
 113. See Powers, supra note 5, at 143 (explaining that if pre-registration cannot be 
a qualification for free assembly, neither can it be for the right to the free exercise of 
religion). 
 114. See Daniel R. Mandelker, An Introduction to Religious Land Use Issues, 
SHO18 A.L.I –A.B.A. LAW INSTITUTE – AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 63, 79 (2002) 
(noting that RLUIPA has caused a “flurry” of threatened and actual litigation). 
 115. Cf. Walston, supra note 4, at 480 (noting that claims under RLUIPA include 
Satan worshippers and an inmate who made up his own religion with a Monday 
Sabbath so that prison officials would exempt him from Monday job duties). 
 116. See Kris Banvard, Exercise in Frustration? A New Attempt by Congress to 
Restore Strict Scrutiny to Governmental Burdens on Religious Practices, 31 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 279, 312 (2003) (noting that RLUIPA is a weapon for religious groups because it 
threatens a long and expensive lawsuit). 
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RFRA.117  As a result of the large number of claims, RLUIPA is 
particularly harmful to local governments because violations of 
RLUIPA will subject local governments to excessive lawsuits.118 
2.  A Study of RLUIPA Cases Since the Statute’s Enactment 
Demonstrates the Judiciary’s Tendency to Ignore Significant Security 
Interests, When Faced with Prisoners’ Religious Claims 
An examination of RLUIPA cases since its enactment in 2000 
demonstrates the way in which the lower courts often push aside 
security concerns in light of prisoners’ religious claims.119  Therefore, 
the Cutter decision to uphold RLUIPA is likely to lead to the 
misapplication of RLUIPA and exacerbate the problems prisoners 
face.  The most common cases involving RLUIPA claims challenge 
prison regulations that forbid inmates from growing their hair past a 
certain length or wearing head coverings, meeting in groups to 
worship, and distributing specific types of banned literature.120  
However, these regulations are targeted towards specific security 
goals, which are based on the experience of prison administrators.121  
Prison regulations forbidding long hair and beards are based on 
prison officials’ beliefs that these regulations prevent inmates from 
hiding contraband in their hair and beards, changing their 
appearance to facilitate escape, and acknowledging gang affiliations 
through their appearances.122  Opponents of RLUIPA point to 
evidence that prison gangs often claim to be religious to further gang 
activities.123  However, the majority of courts have held that prisons 
                                                          
 117. Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (S.D. Ohio 2002), rev’d sub 
nom., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005) 
(noting that, under RFRA, the number of religions Ohio prisoners claimed 
expanded, the religions in question were often extremely unorthodox, and prisoners 
demanded strange services, such as martial arts classes). 
 118. See Autumn L. Rierson, RLUIPA: Three Years Later, SJ053 A.L.I.-
A.B.AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 863, 865 (Apr. 2004) 
(noting that religious institutions are using RLUIPA to “strong arm” local 
communities and that local governments may also be subject to attorney’s fees and 
possible damages). 
 119. See Gaubatz, supra note 97, at 570 (noting that courts are “skeptical” of 
prison administrators arguments that prison policies that ban certain religious 
literature or items are the least restrictive means of advancing a government interest). 
 120. See id. at 558 (noting that in these types of cases, prisoners’ claims have had 
much more success than claims under RFRA or the Turner rational basis standard). 
 121. See Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1552-54 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
the safety and security concerns in a hair length restriction challenge were based on 
the prison officials’ experience in the prison system and were valid concerns). 
 122. See, e.g., Hoevenaar v. Lozaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 123. See Comment, In the Belly of the Whale: Religious Practice in Prison, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1891, 1903 (2002) (noting that in recent years, the concern over hate 
groups masquerading as religious groups has focused on pagan religions, such as 
Asatru). 
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may not categorically prohibit religious exemptions from grooming 
policies and that these regulations constitute a substantial burden on 
religious exercise.124 
For example, in Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, the plaintiff claimed that an 
Ohio prison regulation, which stipulated that all inmates’ hair be no 
more than three inches long violated RLUIPA.125  The plaintiff was a 
Native American who began practicing a native religion while 
incarcerated in a facility that prohibited him from cutting his hair.126  
The prison officials argued that the purpose of the general prison ban 
on long hair was to prevent the concealment of contraband or inmate 
escape.127  Specifically, the officials believed the plaintiff to be a 
particular security threat, as he had a “long history” of hiding 
contraband and had twice attempted to escape from prison.128  
However, the district court granted the plaintiff relief pursuant to 
RLUIPA.129 
Prison officials are also hesitant to allow religious inmates to gather 
in groups or have access to certain types of literature because they fear 
disrupters could utilize these methods to spread extremist views, 
ethnic hatred, or recruit members to gangs or other violent 
organizations.130  Yet courts applying RLUIPA have rejected prison 
officials’ general arguments that focus on the need to eliminate access 
                                                          
 124. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining 
that a regulation requiring a Native American man to keep his hair no longer than 
three inches was not the least restrictive means to further government interest); 
Collins-Bey v. Thomas, No. 03 C 2779, 2004 WL 2381874, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 
2004) (finding that a prison regulation that required the plaintiff to cut his hair in 
violation of his religious beliefs substantially burdened his religious exercise); 
Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that a 
prison was unjustified in preventing Muslim prisoners from wearing beards). 
 125. See 422 F.3d at 367 (explaining that the prison regulation also banned any 
hairstyles that were determined by officials to be a threat to any penological interest). 
 126. See id. (noting that the inmate first commenced an administrative proceeding 
challenging the long hair ban, which was unsuccessful). 
 127. See id. (explaining that prison officials contended that, when assessing the 
security risk, it was not relevant that the plaintiff was a medium security prisoner 
because prisoners escape and contraband problems also occur in medium security 
prisons). 
 128. See id. at *5 (explaining that the safety concerns the prison officials expressed 
were based on their collective experience administering penal institutions). 
 129. See Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 276 F. Supp. 2d 811, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2003), rev’d, 
No. 03-4119, 2005 WL 2154948, at *1 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cutter 
because the district court failed to give appropriate deference to prison officials). 
 130. See, e.g, Marria v. Broadus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) 
(explaining that prison officials do not allow violent groups to assemble or receive 
group literature because to do so would legitimize the status of the group and 
interfere with security); see also Anti-Defamation League, Prison Extremism and the 
First Amendment, http://www.adl.org/civil_rights/prison_ex.asp (last visited July 26, 
2006) (noting that the Aryan Nation publishes a prison outreach newsletter to recruit 
inmates and spread ideas). 
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to literature and other inmates on the grounds of safety and 
security.131  For example, in Marria v. Broaddus, a New York district 
court rejected prison officials’ evidence that the plaintiff prisoners 
posed a threat to prison security and thus, limitations on their access 
to literature and assembly were justified.132  The plaintiff in Marria 
was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths or the Five 
Percenters, which shares many beliefs of the Nation of Islam, 
including the belief that the white man is the devil.133  The New York 
Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) maintained a policy 
that forbade the plaintiff from receiving his religion’s newspaper or 
from assembling with other members of his group.134  Although 
prison officials believed the Five Percenters to be involved in gang 
activity, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, denying the DOCS’s 
motion to dismiss.135 
Decisions finding that prisoners’ state RLUIPA claims or dismissing 
prison officials’ summary judgment motions in the face of important 
security interests are disturbing, particularly because the Court has 
held that prisoners lose some of their rights when they are 
                                                          
 131. See, e.g., Coronel v. Paul, 316 F. Supp. 2d 868, 881 (D. Ariz. 2004) 
(determining that a prison policy which forbid a Dianic pagan prisoner to attend 
other pagan worship services was a substantial burden on the free exercise of 
religion); Borzch v. Frank, 340 F. Supp. 2d 955, 968 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (finding that a 
prison’s policy of forbidding plaintiff’s Odinist literature constituted a substantial 
burden under RLUIPA); Holiday v. Giusto, No. CV 03-01385-AS, 2004 WL 1792466, 
at *7-8 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2004) (denying prison’s motion for summary judgment 
relating to Muslim prisoners’ claim that they were denied the opportunity for group 
prayer); Goodman v. Snyder, No. 00-C-0948, 2003 WL 715650 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 
2003) (finding that prisoners’ rights were substantially burdened by a ban on Asatru 
religious runes); Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and 
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 526 
(2005) (discussing the holding in Limbaugh v. Thompson, where Native American 
prisoners’ rights were substantially burdened by the prison’s refusal to allow a sweat 
lodge). 
 132. See 200 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (noting that the New York State Department of 
Corrections submitted affidavits from its personnel and inmates from all New York 
prison facilities, which characterized the Five Percenters as a gang). 
 133. But see id. at 284 n.3 (remarking that, according to the plaintiff, there are 
many differences between the Five Percenters and the Nation of Islam).  Additionally, 
according to the plaintiff, the Nation of Gods and Earths is not a gang.  Id. at 284. 
 134. See id. at 282 (noting that the plaintiff became a member of the Five 
Percenters while incarcerated). 
 135. See id. at 298 (explaining that the court denied summary judgment to the 
DOCS because a question exists as to whether the ban on the Five Percenters’ 
literature is reasonably related to the DOCS’s security interests); see also Lindell v. 
McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that denying an inmate 
follower of Wotanism access to Wotanist literature and the ability to congregate with 
other Wotanists was a substantial burden on his free exercise).  Wotanism pronounces 
the “Nordic Race” the chosen race and the plaintiff is an “avowed White 
Supremacist.”  Id. at 1108.  However, the court rejected prison officials’ argument 
that they would not acknowledge or endorse racist groups that disrupt prison life.  Id. 
at 1110. 
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incarcerated.136  However, whereas the courts restrict a typical 
prisoner’s rights upon incarceration, RLUIPA abolishes these 
restrictions and allows prisoners to engage in practices that are 
consistent with their religious beliefs, regardless of whether a prison 
system has eliminated a practice because of safety concerns.137  The 
many religious converts that arise in prisons under RLUIPA divert 
prison staff from important security issues and disrupt daily life in the 
prisons.138 
C.  A Future Supreme Court Decision to Revisit the Cutter Court’s 
Establishment Clause Analysis Could Avoid the Negative Impacts of 
RLUIPA 
In its Establishment Clause analysis, the Cutter Court determined 
that RLUIPA is a valid accommodation of religion because it does not 
prefer one religion over another religion.139  The Court emphasized 
this point repeatedly, noting that RLUIPA “will be administered 
neutrally among different faiths.”140  However, while the Court based 
its determination that RLUIPA is consistent with the Establishment 
Clause on the conclusion that RLUIPA applies equally to different 
religious sects, it did not fully address whether RLUIPA prefers 
religion over irreligion.141  In fact, Justice Ginsberg’s sole analysis of 
the latter issue was in a footnote.142 
This section contends that RLUIPA resulted in the preferential 
treatment of religious prisoners and has the effect of persuading non-
religious prisoners that they will receive better treatment in prison by 
feigning religious belief.143  Thus, a future Court could reach the 
                                                          
 136. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1977) 
(holding that an inmate retains only those rights that are consistent with the 
important penological objectives of the prison system). 
 137. See generally Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
these practices include wearing religious headgear and icons, having ungroomed hair 
and beards, receiving extremist literature, and refusing to submit to medical tests). 
 138. See Respondents’ Brief in Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 53, at 19 (arguing that an additional effect of the large number of religious 
requests under RLUIPA is that the small number of prison chaplains must spend 
their time dealing with the requests instead of organizing religious programs). 
 139. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2114, 2123 (2005) (noting that RLUIPA 
does not give any religious group privileged status). 
 140. See id. at 2115 (explaining that RLUIPA does not “differentiate among bona 
fide faith[s]”). 
 141. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 2 (noting that the 
court emphasized that RLUIPA was necessary because majority faiths are often 
favored and minority religions disadvantaged). 
 142. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2122 n.10 (providing a response to the Respondent’s 
notion that one effect of RLUIPA is that it encourages non-religious prisoners to “get 
religion,” thereby advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 143. See Marci Hamilton, California’s Defeat of a State RLUIPA Bill: The Growing 
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conclusion that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause, by 
approaching the Establishment Clause analysis of RLUIPA from a 
different perspective.144 
RLUIPA favors and protects those prisoners who follow an 
organized belief of religion over those without a system of religious 
belief.145  As a result of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard, prisoners 
who claim to have a religious faith are exempt from many of the 
hardships that are part of prison life.146  RLUIPA provides benefits 
solely on a religious basis because it is only applicable to religious 
prisoners, and thus, atheist and agnostic prisoners cannot utilize 
RLUIPA.147  The enormous and disproportionate amount of 
protection RLUIPA gives to religious prisoners is evident in the many 
exemptions and privileges courts require prison officials to provide 
only to religious prisoners under RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard.148  
Thus, RLUIPA’s effect is to advance religion to the disadvantage of 
non-religious prisoners.149 
Proponents of RLUIPA argue that the Court previously has upheld 
statutes exempting religious organizations and persons from certain 
burdens; thus, RLUIPA does not advance religion.150  However, 
RLUIPA is distinguishable from these rulings because in the cases in 
which the Court upheld religious exemptions, a number of secular 
                                                          
Backlash Against Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Acts, Jan. 24, 2004, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20040129.html (last visited July 26, 2006) 
(stating that the effect of RLUIPA is to treat the non-religious and the religious 
unequally under the law). 
 144. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (explaining that a statute 
violates the Establishment Clause if it has the effect of advancing religion).  To 
determine if a statute advances religion, the Court considers whether the act will 
induce religious exercise, rather than only protect it.  Id.; see also Texas Monthly v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (noting that the State may not compel non-religious 
people to be religious). 
 145. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 189 (noting that eighteenth century essayist 
Samuel Johnson’s maxim, “[t]o be of no church is dangerous,” is more true in the 
time of RLUIPA than ever before). 
 146. See, e.g., Figel v. Overton, 121 F. App’x 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
a prisoner who alleged that the confiscation of prohibited publications violated his 
First Amendment right to free religion stated a claim under RLUIPA). 
 147. See 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1 (reiterating that RLUIPA prohibits the state from 
imposing a burden on religious exercise). 
 148. See, e.g., People v. Peterson, No. 7687/01, slip op. at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 
2002) (upholding a Rastafari prisoner’s challenge under RLUIPA to restrictions on 
hair lengths in prisons). 
 149. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 201 (explaining that RLUIPA advances religion to 
the detriment of non-religious groups because only religious individuals can use 
RLUIPA, and therefore non-believers are at a disadvantage). 
 150. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983) (upholding tax 
deductions for religious education); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 
(1970) (upholding a statute that exempted religious organizations from property 
taxes). 
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groups also received the benefit conferred, whereas RLUIPA applies 
only to religious organizations.151  The unequal treatment of religious 
and non-religious prisoners resulting from RLUIPA counters the 
Establishment Clause’s fundamental principal of neutrality.152 
By enacting RLUIPA, Congress gave the religious community a 
broad right to claim strict scrutiny review, which atheists and agnostics 
do not have.153  The various exceptions RLUIPA provides send the 
message to non-religious inmates that they are outsiders to a 
privileged community.154 
An additional effect of RLUIPA is that its potential benefits induce 
prisoners to feign a religious belief in order to receive the same 
benefits as religious inmates.155  The Supreme Court has held that the 
government may not compel non-religious members of society to 
become religious.156  However, under RLUIPA, this is exactly what 
happens.157  As Congress noted when it enacted RLUIPA, the prison 
environment is one of limited freedoms, with little access to the 
outside world and where prison administrators regulate all actions.158  
Because of the restrictive nature of prison communities, prisoners 
treasure all exceptions to rules; thus, any exceptions can lead to 
jealousy among inmates.159 
                                                          
 151. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 707 (indicating that the property tax exemption statute 
applied generally to all non-profits that engaged in moral or mental improvement of 
others, including hospitals, libraries, and cemeteries). 
 152. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654 n.3 (2002) (indicating that 
neutrality is the “touchstone” of the Establishment Clause). 
 153. Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 453-54 (1994) 
(noting that compared to religious groups, secular groups receive no preferential 
legal treatment). 
 154. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(condemning direct government endorsement of religion because it sends a message 
to non-religious citizens that they are not members of the political community, and a 
message to adherents that they are favored members of society). 
 155. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the 
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 292 n.357 (1989) (observing that if it were as 
burdensome to claim religious exemption as any other exemption, motives for 
fraudulent claims would decrease). 
 156. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (noting that the 
government “may not compel affirmation of religious belief”). 
 157. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (stating that the government 
cannot coerce anyone to participate in religion without violating the Establishment 
Clause). 
 158. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (testifying that RLUIPA can offer a remedy to 
institutionalized persons because prison official often burden inmates’ rights with 
unfair and arbitrary rules and restrict their liberty for reasons of indifference, 
ignorance, racism or monetary restraints). 
 159. See Dehart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that inmates can 
become jealous of other inmates’ special religious diets); Garrett v. Gilmore, 926 F. 
Supp. 554, 557 (W.D. Va. 1996) (explaining that exceptions to prison rules cause 
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Under RLUIPA, religious inmates often receive preferential 
treatment and a privileged status.  Non-religious inmates, however, 
remain limited in their exercise of fundamental rights, must eat a 
prison diet, and allow guards to cut their hair and censor their 
mail.160  If a non-religious inmate is fed up with unequal treatment 
and wishes to have the same benefits as the religious inmates, his first 
option is to challenge the regulation under the Turner rational 
relation test, which is deferential to prison officials and is less likely to 
result in victory for the inmate.161  His second option is to claim that 
he shares the same religious beliefs as the inmates who receive the 
preferential treatment he envies and RLUIPA will protect him.162  
Considering the isolated and restrictive environment prisoners are in, 
many prisoners will opt for the latter option and feign religious 
conversion.163 
Justice Ginsberg’s fleeting analysis of whether RLUIPA privileges 
religion over nonreligion resides solely in a footnote.164  In response 
to the Respondent’s argument that RLUIPA bestows advantages on 
religious prisoners causing burdened, non-religious prisoners to 
“feign piety” to receive the same treatment, the Court advances several 
justifications.165  First, the Court argues that the accommodations 
non-religious prisoners may gain by simulating religious conversion 
are not truly “benefits.”166  The Court’s argument to support this 
assertion is hardly persuasive.  The Court admits that some 
accommodations of religion, unavailable to non-religious prisoners, 
are obviously benefits, such as the “opportunity to assemble. . .  
[,which] might attract joiners seeking a break in their closely guarded 
day.”167  However, the Court counters the example of 
                                                          
resentment among inmates). 
 160. See 60 AM. JUR. 2D. Penal and Correctional Institutions § 23 (2004) (noting 
that incarceration results in the removal or limitation of many privileges and rights 
normally afforded to citizens). 
 161. See Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002) (describing the 
rational relation test under Turner as very deferential to prison officials). 
 162. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1442-1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995) 
(evaluating a challenge under RFRA and worrying that prisoners might use religion 
as a pretext for secular desires). 
 163. See Shawn P. Bailey, The Establishment Clause and the Religious Land and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 16 REGENT U.L. REV. 53, 76 (2003) (admitting 
that RLUIPA could encourage religion if courts allow inmates to abuse RLUIPA). 
 164. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 
2122 n.10 (2005) (responding to Respondent’s argument that RLUIPA goes beyond 
the permissible reduction of the free exercise of religion). 
 165. See id. (noting that Respondents argue that RLUIPA advances religion by 
encouraging inmates to become religious). 
 166. See id. (emphasizing “doubt” that all accommodations are considered 
“benefits” by inmates). 
 167. See id. (noting that Respondent’s Brief argued that one effect of RLUIPA is 
25
Johnson: Heaven Help Us: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Pers
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
610 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:3 
accommodation by noting that one state served a monotonous meal 
as its kosher diet.168  It is hard to imagine that an unpleasant meal 
could compensate for the exclusion from the constitutional right to 
assemble.  Further, the example of one specific instance of a religious 
accommodation that is moderately unpleasant does not lead to the 
conclusion that other religious accommodations are not benefits.169  
The Court’s description of an unappetizing kosher meal does not 
negate the fact that under RLUIPA, religious prisoners receive access 
to literature, the right to assemble, and freedom from regulations 
prohibiting long hair and literature that non-religious prisoners do 
not.170 
Second, the Court notes that prisons already give special treatment 
to certain mainstream religious groups.171  The Court contends that 
because the prison system currently provides chaplains, places to 
assemble, and other services for conventional religions, 
accommodation under RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment 
Clause.172  However, this rationale does not address the issue at hand.  
By making the argument that all religious prisoners, including those 
who adhere to non-traditional religions, must be allowed 
accommodation under RLUIPA because those who adhere to 
traditional religions already are, the Court again focuses on RLUIPA’s 
treatment of particular religions, instead of the burden on non-
religious prisoners.173  However, it does not matter which particular 
religious groups have access to literature or a place to assemble.  The 
point is that all prisoners who are atheist cannot gain the right to 
assemble pursuant to RLUIPA.174 
                                                          
to induce inmates to pretend to be religious in order to receive the statute’s benefits). 
 168. See id. (noting that congressional hearings on RLUIPA revealed that one 
prison’s kosher diet contained a fruit, a vegetable, a granola bar, and a nutritional 
supplement). 
 169. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (noting that the 
exercise of religion often involves the consummation of wine and specific foods). 
 170. Compare Williams v. Snyder, 150 F. App’x 549, 554 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(determining that a Rastafarian inmate who alleged prison officials requested he 
remove his dreadlocks stated a claim under RLUIPA), with Williams, 2005 WL 
2346964, at *3 (holding that a Rastafarian prisoner’s challenge to a prison hair length 
policy failed to state valid claims under equal protection, access to courts, due 
process, or the Eighth Amendment). 
 171. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2122 n.10 (noting that, in the case of mainstream 
religious faiths, inmates may attend religious congregations and have access to Bibles 
and other religious materials). 
 172. Cf. Louise M. Holscher, Sweat Lodges and Headbands: An Introduction to 
the Rights of Native American Prisoners, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
33, 37 (1992) (noting that prisons usually accommodate mainstream religions). 
 173. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2123 (explaining that RLUIPA gives no specific 
religious group rights or benefits that other religious groups lack). 
 174. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2005) (explaining that RLUIPA only applies to 
challenges to governmental actions that burden inmates’ religious exercise). 
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CONCLUSION 
In his outspoken concurrence striking down RFRA in City of 
Boerne, Justice Stevens suggested that RFRA violated the 
Establishment Clause, stating that RFRA “provided the Church with a 
legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain”175  Therefore, it 
follows that many anticipated that Justice Stevens would be the lone 
dissenter in Cutter.176  However, this was not the case, most likely 
because, in Cutter, the Court failed to fully assess the impact RLUIPA 
has had on those prisoners who are not atheist or agnostic.177 
Like its predecessor, RLUIPA is much more than an 
accommodation of religion; it gives religious groups and inmates a 
powerful tool that they can use to gain benefits not available to 
others.178  Under RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard, prisoners who 
invent religious reasons for their demands receive different 
treatment.179  RLUIPA’s minimal requirements for proving a religious 
belief will lead to excessive litigation under RLUIPA and more and 
more prisoners will claim to be members of non-orthodox religions in 
order to benefit from the protections of religions.180  Further, 
because RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard places the burden of proof 
on prison officials, government administrators ultimately will spend 
their time defending necessary prison procedures, instead of 
anticipating security concerns.181 
The Cutter Court may have been aware of the many problems 
implicated by the statute’s strict scrutiny standard and thus, attempted 
to restrain the application of RLUIPA in their May 31, 2005 
opinion.182  However, by requiring lower courts to adjudicate 
                                                          
 175. See 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that the 
exemption at issue in City of Boerne was government preference for religion over no 
religion). 
 176. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 3 (surmising that it is 
possible the reason Justice Stevens did not dissent in Cutter was that he believed 
RLUIPA claims would fail even if the law were upheld). 
 177. See id. at 2 (noting that in analyzing the constitutionality of RLUIPA pursuant 
to the Establishment Clause the Court focused on congressional evidence that 
minority religions are often discriminated against in prisons and that RLUIPA helps 
relieve this problem). 
 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (establishing that RLUIPA is only available to people 
and institutions asserting religious rights). 
 179. See supra Part II.C (discussing that because under RLUIPA religious prisoners 
receive greater protection, non-religious prisoners have incentive to convert). 
 180. See supra Part II.B (noting that Congress designed RLUIPA’s requirements to 
allow as many claims as possible). 
 181. See Walston, supra note 4, at 480 (arguing that as a result of the excessive 
claims prisoners file under RLUIPA “no good act by prison officials will go 
unpunished”). 
 182. See supra Part II.A (explaining that the Cutter Court appeared to create a 
new standard of scrutiny for RLUIPA claims that is strict and deferential). 
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RLUIPA claims pursuant to strict scrutiny standards, yet 
“appropriately deferential” to prison officials, the Court created a 
standard that is confusing and may lead to inconsistent outcomes.183 
 
                                                          
 183. See, e.g., Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(determining that, based on the outcome of the Cutter decision, the district court 
failed to give proper deference to the prison system and therefore remanded the 
case); Gooden v. Crain, 389 F. Supp 2d 722, 728 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting a Texas 
prison’s motion to dismiss a Muslim inmate’s challenge to prison grooming 
regulation under RLUIPA because the Cutter court had determined that RLUIPA is a 
valid accommodation of religion). 
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